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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jesse Stephen Barber appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury 
verdict finding him guilty of domestic violence and his stipulation to the felony 
sentencing enhancement under I.C. § 18-918(3)(c). Barber claims that, despite 
his stipulation to the prior convictions, the evidence was insufficient to support 
the enhancement and that he was denied his right to a jury trial on the 
enhancement. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
The state charged Barber with domestic violence after he battered his 
girlfriend. (R., pp.23-24; PSI, p.3.) Based on two prior domestic violence 
convictions within 15 years, the state also alleged a felony enhancement. (R., 
p.24.) Barber pied not guilty and the case proceeded to trial. (R., pp.32, 49-59.) 
At trial, Barber was represented by counsel until the state rested at which 
time Barber indicated his desire to represent himself. (Trial Tr., p.203, Ls.5-6, 
p.205, Ls.3-23.) After engaging in further discussion, Barber was allowed to 
represent himself with his attorney acting as standby counsel. (Trial Tr., p.205, 
L.24 - p.213, L.22.) 
The jury acquitted Barber of domestic battery with traumatic injury but 
found him guilty of domestic battery without traumatic injury. (Trial Tr., p.380, 
L.11 - p.381, L.4; R., pp.62-63.) After the verdict, the court advised the jury it 
would now need to consider "Part II" of the case - whether Barber had two prior 
felony convictions. (Trial Tr., p.381, L.20 - p.382, L.11.) The state then called 
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its first witness, Detective Rome Stiffler, and asked that he be handed two 
exhibits. (Trial Tr., p.382, Ls.13-20.) At that point, Barber interjected, stating: 
"I'm not denying that I have two prior convictions." (Trial Tr., p.382, Ls.21-22.) 
Defense counsel added: "It would make it easier, Your Honor, if we just stipulate 
that he has the two prior convictions from 201 O." (Trial Tr., p.382, Ls.23-25.) 
The court advised Barber that "the issue" was whether he had "two prior 
[domestic battery] convictions within the past 15 years" and asked whether he 
was "willing to stipulate" to that or whether he "want[ed] to require the State to 
put on evidence." (Trial Tr., p.383, Ls.1-6.) Barber responded: "Yeah, I'll 
stipulate to that." (Trial Tr., p.383, Ls.7-8.) "Based upon that stipulation," the 
court found "there are two prior convictions of domestic battery."1 (Trial Tr., 
p.383, Ls.9-12.) 
The court imposed a unified five-year sentence with two years fixed. (R., 
pp.67-69.) Barber filed a motion for reduction of sentence, which the court 
granted. (R., pp.71-74, 91-92.) Barber timely appealed from the judgment. (R., 
pp.85-87.) 
1 The prior judgments, marked as Exhibits 4 and 5, were admitted without 
objection. (Trial Tr., p.383, L.16 - p.384, L.3.) 
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ISSUES 
Barber states the issue on appeal as: 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to establish the facts necessary 
to find the felony enhancement, namely that Mr. Barber had 
two separate and distinct prior convictions for domestic 
battery? 
2. Was Mr. Barber deprived of his constitutional right to a jury 
trial when the district court found the sentencing 
enhancement in the absence of a knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary waiver of his right to a jury trial on the issue? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Because Barber stipulated that he had two prior domestic battery 
convictions, has he waived his claim that the evidence was insufficient to support 
the felony enhancement? Alternatively, has Barber failed to show the two prior 
domestic violence judgments were insufficient to support the felony 
enhancement? 
2. Has Barber failed to show error, much less fundamental error, in 




By Stipulating That He Had Two Prior Domestic Battery Convictions, Barber 
Waived His Claim That The State Presented Insufficient Evidence To Support 
The Felony Enhancement: Alternatively. The Prior Domestic Violence Judgments 
Were Sufficient To Support The Enhancement 
A Introduction 
Barber contends "the State failed to present sufficient evidence from 
which the district court could have concluded that he had been previously 
convicted of the two separate and distinct domestic batteries necessary to 
elevate the domestic battery conviction in this case to a felony under Idaho Code 
§ 18-918(3)(c)." (Appellant's Brief, p.4.) Barber's claim fails. By admitting the 
two prior convictions, Barber waived any challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support the felony enhancement. Even if not waived, the evidence 
was sufficient to support the enhancement. 
B. Barber's Sufficiency Claim Was Waived By His Stipulation 
It is well-settled that when a defendant pleads guilty, he "waives his right 
to require the State to prove the charges at trial." State v. Gallipeau, 128 Idaho 
1, 6, 909 P.2d 619, 624 (Ct. App. 1994) (citation omitted). Likewise, a stipulation 
to the existence of prior convictions for purposes of an enhancement also 
relieves the state of its burden of proof and waives any challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the enfiancement:' As noted in State v. 
Wilhelm, 135 Idaho 111, 118, 15 P.3d 824, 831 (Ct. App. 2000), a defendant 
"may not return the burden of proof to the State after admitting the persistent 
violator allegation in his guilty plea." This same principle was reiterated in State 
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v. Cheatham, 139 Idaho 413,416, 80 P.3d 349, 352 (Ct. App. 2003), where the 
Court stated: " A stipulation to the truth of the persistent violator allegation 
amounts to a waiver of th[e] right to require that the State prove the prior 
convictions to a jury and of the right to rebut the State's evidence." 
Barber's complaint that the state failed to "invoke the exception" in Brandt 
by not "present[ing] charging instruments for the two cases, documents 
regarding a plea agreement, and/or transcripts from the plea hearings" is without 
merit because his stipulation relieved the state of its obligation to do so. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Barber's sufficiency of the evidence claim is waived. 
C. Even If Barber's Stipulation Did Not Waive His Challenge To The 
Sufficiency Of The Evidence. He Has Failed To Establish The Evidence 
Was Insufficient 
Barber's sufficiency of the evidence claim is based on his position that his 
two prior convictions for domestic violence were not "separate and distinct 
domestic batteries necessary to elevate the domestic battery conviction in this 
case to a felony under Idaho Code§ 18-918(3)(c)." (Appellant's Brief, p.4.) A 
plain reading of the felony enhancement provision of I.C. § 18-918(3)(c) reveals 
otherwise. 
"The interpretation of a statute 'must begin with the literal words of the 
statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and 
the statute must be construed as a whole."' Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regionar 
Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011) (quoting State v. 
Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003). '"If the statute is not 
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ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as 
written."' ~ 
Idaho Code Section 18-918(3)(c) provides, in relevant part, that "[a]ny 
person who pleads guilty to or is found guilty of a violation of [1.C. § 18-918(3)] 
who previously has pied guilty to or been found guilty of two (2) violations of [I.C. 
§ 18-918(3)], ... within fifteen (15) years of the first conviction, shall be guilty of 
a felony . . .. " Thus, the only predicate for enhancing a domestic battery 
conviction to a felony is two prior convictions under I.C. § 18-918(3) within 15 
years. Exhibits 4 and 5, which were admitted at trial, show Barber has two prior 
convictions under I.C. § 18-918(3), which, under the plain language of the 
. statute, is sufficient evidence to support the felony enhancement. 
Notwithstanding the plain language of the statute, Barber invites the Court 
to construe I.C. § 18-918(3)(c) the same way the Court of Appeals construed the 
persistent violator statute, I.C. § 19-2514, in State v. Brandt, 110 Idaho 341, 344, 
715 P.2d 1011, 1014 (Ct. App. 1986). (Appellant's Brief, pp.4-6.) In Brandt, the 
Court adopted the general proposition "that convictions entered the same day or 
charged in the same information should count as a single conviction for 
purposes of establishing habitual offender status" under I.C. § 19-2514. ~ at 
344, 715 P.2d at 104. The Court, however, held that "the nature of the 
convictions in any situation must be examined to make certain that the general 
rule is appropriate." ~ If an examination of the prior convictions reveals that the 
convictions were for separate and distinct offenses, the convictions will be 
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considered separate for purposes of the persistent violator enhancement even if 
the judgments were entered the same day. kL. 
Barber seeks to take advantage of the rule from Brandt and related cases 
by analogizing the felony domestic battery enhancement to the persistent violator 
enhancement. (Appellant's Brief, pp.4-8.) Although Brandt interpreted the 
persistent violator statute, I. C. § 19-2514, in a way to support a policy belief that 
a "defendant should be entitled to an opportunity to reform himself between 
convictions or that the persistent violator statute seeks to warn first time 
offenders," Brandt, 110 Idaho at 344, 715 P.2d at 1014, nothing in the plain 
language of the felony domestic violence enhancement, I.C. § 18-918(3)(c), 
reflects such a legislative intent nor is the state aware of any case construing the 
felony domestic violence statute in this manner. Because I. C. § 18-918(3)( c) 
does not require an analysis of the facts or circumstances underlying the prior 
convictions, Barber's claim that Exhibits 4 and 5 were insufficient to support the 
felony enhancement fails. 
II. 
Barber Has Failed To Show Error, Much Less, Fundamental Error In Relation To 
His Stipulation 
A. Introduction 
Barber contends the "district court deprived him of his constitutional right 
to a jury trial on the felony enhancement" and that his "waiver of his right to a jury 
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trial" was not "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary."2 (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) 
Barber has f1:3iled to show that his stipulation to the two prior convictions did not 
validly waive his state law right to a jury trial. As such, he has failed to show 
error, much less fundamental error, in relation to the stipulation. 
B. Because Barber's Stipulation Was Valid, He Has Failed To Meet His 
Burden Of Showing Error, Much Less Fundamental Error. Resulting From 
The Court's Acceptance Of His Stipulation To The Felony Enhancement 
Barber contends he is entitled to remand "for a jury trial because the 
district court deprived him of his constitutional right to a jury trial on the felony 
enhancement ... in the absence of a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver 
of his right to a jury trial." {Appellant's Brief, p.9.) Application of the correct legal 
standards, including the requirements for proving fundamental error, to the 
record shows Barber has failed to show error, much less fundamental error, 
entitling him to a trial on the felony enhancement he stipulated to at trial. 
In support of his argument, Barber relies heavily on the Court of Appeals' 
opinion in State v. Cheatham, 139 Idaho 413, 80 P.3d 349 (Ct. App. 2003). 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.12-14.) In Cheatham, the defendant was charged with 
felony possession of methamphetamine and two misdemeanor offenses. kl. at 
414, 80 P.3d at 350. The state also alleged Cheatham "was subject to a 
2 Barber asserts a violation of his right to a jury trial "under both the Idaho and 
United States Constitutions." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) However, there is no 
federal constitutional right to a jury trial for a sentencing enhancement. Apprendi 
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding that other than the fact of a prior 
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt). 
Thus, Barber's assertion that he was denied his right to a jury trial under the 
United States Constitution is without merit. 
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persistent violator sentence enhancement pursuant to I.C. § 19-2514" based on 
two prior felony convictions. ~ "After the jury delivered a verdict finding 
Cheatham guilty of the charged crimes, Cheatham's attorney stipulated to the 
truth of the persistent violator allegation." ~ at 414-15, 80 P.3d at 350-51. 
Although Cheatham was present at the time of the stipulation, the court did not 
ask him "whether he voluntarily assented to the stipulation or understood its 
effect on his potential sentence."~ at 415, 80 P.3d at 351. Based on counsel's 
stipulation, Cheatham was subject to the enhancement. ~ at 414, 80 P.3d at 
350. "Cheatham thereafter moved to dismiss the persistent violator charge on 
the ground that he did not personally admit to the truth of the allegation and no 
evidence had been presented supporting it." ~ at 415, 80 P.3d at 351. ''The 
district court denied the motion, reasoning that the persistent violator statute 
does not create a separate crime and therefore constitutional requirements for 
taking a guilty plea do not apply when a court accepts admission of a persistent 
violator allegation." ~ 
On appeal, Cheatham argued the enhancement "must be vacated 
because he neither pleaded guilty to nor received a trial on the enhancement 
allegation." Cheatham, 139 Idaho at 416, 80 P.3d at 352. Cheatham further 
asserted that a stipulation to a persistent violator enhancement is the "functional 
equivalent of a guilty plea and therefore can be effectuated only by the 
defendant personally, subject to the standards established in Boykin v. Alabama, 
395 U.S. 238, 242 [(1969)] ... , to assure that a guilty plea is knowing, intelligent 
and voluntary." Cheatham, 139 Idaho at 416, 80 P.3d at 352. The Court of 
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Appeals rejected Cheatham's argument that "a full Boykin litany" was necessary, 
but held "that a stipulation to the truth of a persistent violator allegation will be 
valid only if the record shows that the defendant entered into the stipulation 
voluntarily in the sense that the defendant was not coerced, and knowingly in the 
sense that the defendant understands the potential sentencing consequences." 
1st. at 418, 80 P.3d at 354. 
More recently, the Court of Appeals addressed a similar issue in State v. 
Hochrein, 2013 WL 1501514 (Ct. App. 2013). In Hochrein, the stipulation at 
issue involved certain elements of the alleged crime - violation of a no contact 
order. 1st. at *1. Unlike in Cheatham, the defendant in Hochrein failed to 
challenge the validity of the stipulation in the district court. 1st. at *2. As such, the 
Court applied the three-prong fundamental error test from State v. Perry. 150 
Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010). Hochrein at *2. As noted in Hochrein, 
establishing fundamental error under Perry requires an appellant to show the 
alleged error "(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived constitutional rights; (2) 
is clear or obvious without the need for reference to any additional information 
not contained the appellate record; and (3) affected the outcome of the trial 
proceedings." 1st. (citing Perry, supra). The Court ultimately resolved Hochrein's 
claim on the plain error prong, noting that Cheatham was distinguishable since, 
in Hochrein's case, "the parties stipulated to some, but not all, of the facts 
necessary for the conviction of the charged offense" whereas in Cheatham, 
"counsel agreed to a stipulation admitting to the entirety of the persistent violator 
charge." Hohcrein at *3 (emphasis original). The Court also noted the "weight of 
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authority from other jurisdictions," holding that "due process protections 
attendant to the entry of a guilty plea do not apply to factual stipulations 
admitting only some of the facts necessary for conviction of a charged offense or 
enhancement." kl "Based on this authority," the Court concluded the alleged 
error was not "plain" and, therefore, the "issue [was] not one of fundamental error 
under the Perry standard" that would be considered for the first time on appeal. 
kl 
The alleged error in this case likewise fails under Perry. As noted, the first 
prong of Perry requires Barber to show violation of an unwaived constitutional 
right. The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that "under Idaho law, when a 
persistent violator enhancement is sought, the defendant is entitled to a jury trial 
on the State's allegation of previous felony convictions." Cheatham, 139 Idaho 
at 416, 80 P.3d at 352. Assuming this right under Idaho law is found in the Idaho 
Constitution, thereby invoking Perry. Barber waived his right to a jury trial on this 
issue by virtue of his stipulation. Barber, however, argues his stipulation was 
invalid under Cheatham. (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) More specifically, Barber 
claims the "requirements set forth in Cheatham were not satisfied" because the 
court did not "inform [him] what the consequences of a finding on the 
enhancement were, or ask whether, by his stipulation, he intended to waive his 
constitutional right to a jury finding on the enhancement." (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.13-14.) Barber is incorrect. 
There is· nothing in the record to support Barber's implied assertion that 
his stipulation was not "voluntar[y] in the sense that [he] was not coerced" or 
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"knowing" in the sense that he did not "understand[ ] the potential sentencing 
consequences." Cheatham, 139 Idaho at 418, 80 P.3d at 354. When the state 
started to present evidence on the enhancement, Barber interjected on his own 
without any prompting by the court, telling the court he was "not denying" he had 
"two prior convictions" and that he would be willing to "stipulate" to that rather 
than having the state present evidence. (Trial Tr., p.382, L.18 - p.383, L.8.) No 
reading of the record would support a claim that Barber's actions in this regard 
were anything but voluntary. 
The record also contradicts any assertion that Barber did not understand 
the "potential sentencing consequences" of his stipulation. Although the state 
does not dispute that the court did not advise Barber of the "potential sentencing 
consequences" at the moment Barber announced he was "not denying" the prior 
convictions and would stipulate to their existence, the court made the following 
statement right before Barber did so: 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, this raises an additional issue 
with the verdict, so we're not quite finished yet. I need to read an 
additional portion of the Information which has been filed in this 
case. As I previously indicated to you, the alternative charge was 
domestic battery without a traumatic injury. Part II of that charge 
makes that charge a felony depending upon prior convictions. 
There's an allegation, Count I, Part II, as to domestic battery 
without a traumatic injury that Defendant, Jesse Stephen Barber, 
has pleaded guilty or was found guilty on two other violations of 
Idaho Code Section 18-918(3) within the past 15 years, to wit: 
Bonneville County Case Number CR-10-8164 and Bonneville 
County Case Number CR-10-9228. So that is still an issue, at least 
for now, which requires us to reopen the cases, take evidence on 
those alleged prior convictions. 
(Trial Tr., p.381, L.20 - p.382, L.11 (emphasis added).) 
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While the court did not detail the specific sentencing options related to the 
felony enhancement, Barber was clearly made aware just prior to his stipulation 
that an admission to the prior convictions would enhance his domestic battery 
conviction to a felony. The record also indicates that, at his arraignment, the 
court advised Barber that the maximum possible penalty if he was convicted was 
up to five years in prison and and/or a $5,000.00 fine. (R., p.25A.) The court 
minutes further indicate that, when advised of these potential penalties, Barber 
acknowledged he understood and acknowledged he had . a copy of the 
Information (R., p.25B), which reads: 
COUNT I, PART II 
FELONY STATUS, I.C. § 18-918(3)(c) 
The Defendant, JESSE STEPHEN BARBER, has plead 
guilty or was found guilty on two (2) other violations of Idaho Code 
18-918(3), within the past fifteen (15) years, to wit: Bonneville 
County case numbers CR-10-8164 and CR-10-9228. (5 years, 
$5,000.00 fine, and restitution.) 
(R., p.24 (emphasis original)). 
Based on the record, Barber cannot seriously contend that his stipulation 
did not meet the knowing and voluntary requirements as articulated in 
Cheatham. Whether viewed as part of the first prong of Perry or under the plain 
error prong, Barber has failed to meet his burden of establishing his stipulation 
and related waiver of his right to a jury trial was invalid. 3 Barber has, therefore, 
failed to show error, much less fundamental error, entitling him to a remand of 
3 If this Court concludes Barber met his burden under prongs one and two, the 
state would concede that the error was not harmless since the stipulation 
enhanced his conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor.· 
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this case for the purpose of conducting a jury trial on the enhancement. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Barber's conviction 
for felony domestic violence. 
DATED this 22nd day of May 2013. 
JESJ:!= 
Deputy Attorney General . 
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